Are Accountants The Weakest Link In Unraveling The Fraudclosure Scandal?

With the recent realization that virtually the entire residential mortgage securitization system in America is hinging on fraud, as few if any of the recent structured finance packages actually were in possession of the necessary mortgage promissory notes (which were often improperly retained by seller banks as has been made all too clear after rounds of sworn and recorded servicer testimonies) we have seen a veritable explosion in the discussions, papers, essays and op-eds that claim that the existing housing system in America is based on a legal lie. Yet despite what has become glaringly obvious, the administration and the banks simply refuse to deal with the issue: that is to be expected as the damaging discoveries would result in a collapse in trillions of structured finance products leading to a fall out far worse than anything in the post-Lehman days. Furthermore, since banks now have recourse to trillions in fungible excess reserves the backdoor schemes to fill capital deficiencies will allow banks to pad the funding holes for the indefinite future. Additionally, rumors that the banks are pushing hard for a class settlement with the various attorneys general who have not yet been co-opted, bribed and otherwise converted to the fold indicates that it may only be a matter of time before this topic, which has lead so many in the blogosphere to the edge of hysteria will soon be buried. So is this merely another open and shut case which will disappear soon, and banks will continue with life and record bonuses as they know? Perhaps not. Bloomberg's Jonathan Weil suggests that instead of going after the banks and the legal system, which is now obviously beyond repair, those who seek justice should instead go after what could be the weakest link in the entire fraudclosure chain: the (well paid) auditors of these banks who may have committed fraud by signing off on their financial statements.